NATO Plus Security Formula: What's Right and Wrong with Security Models for Ukraine

Israel's security model? Or maybe South Korean? Perhaps Taiwanese? West German? At times, proposals to implement this or that model in Ukraine makes a lot of heads gyrate. Ukrainians — at the level of both political elites and society — have decided on their answer, considering NATO membership to be the most reliable security model for Ukraine. At the same time, the absence of alternatives to NATO accession does not imply that certain elements of security models cannot be discussed or even involved at the stage before joining the Alliance and even after joining it because in view of a number of factors, even potential membership in NATO must be buttressed by some other elements. In other words, this is a kind of a “NATO plus” model for Ukraine. In its new analytical discussion paper on security options for Ukraine, the New Europe Center decided to analyze the four most frequently discussed security models in order to find out which elements of these options may be relevant for Ukraine and which are not at all, and why we return to the idea of joining NATO, at least gradually, one way or another.

Four Models: What Can Be Adopted

A detailed analysis of four security models — South Korean, Israeli, West German and Taiwanese — serves as confirmation that Ukraine could (and de facto has already begun) to adopt certain elements from them. In particular, this is happening through the process of concluding bilateral documents on security commitments with the US and other international partners, which to some extent resemble the corresponding framework agreements that Washington has entered into with Israel and Taiwan.

Ukraine could very well borrow, at least until the moment it gains NATO membership, other useful elements from different models, thus forming some sort of a mix of the most valuable aspects each of them has. For example, from the Israeli model, an instrument of ten-year memorandums of understanding specifying clear amounts of annual support for each of the years could be relevant (although against the background of the debate in the US with the inhibition of aid not only to Ukraine, but also to Israel, the chances of implementing this option look increasingly bleak). From Taiwan’s model, by the time Ukraine is granted NATO membership, it would be appropriate to borrow an element of “strategic uncertainty” as to whether the United States, on the basis of a bilateral document currently being developed within the framework of the Declaration on Security Commitments, will help protect Ukraine, not just provide it with support.

The problem, however, is that in relation to Ukraine, inferior, truncated or reduced versions of potentially the most interesting models are currently being discussed – without the most valuable elements for ensuring our security and deterring the next waves of aggression. For example, the Korean model could be acceptable for Ukraine only in case of signing a bilateral agreement with the US, which would lay down genuine security guarantees and, in the future, the deployment of American military components or elements of the US nuclear tactical weapons on Ukrainian soil, as was the case with South Korea. Even today, this country ranks third globally in terms of the number of American troops on its territory, trailing Japan and Germany. At present, the South Korean model for Ukraine is talked about mainly in the context of the political ability to “recognize” a stalemate on the battlefield with the subsequent “freezing” of the conflict, with neither side necessarily admitting its defeat (while forgetting that in the Korean case the status of quo regarding the demarcation line was maintained, whereas in the Ukrainian case we have had more territories occupied since the beginning of the full-scale invasion).

De facto, what Ukraine is currently being offered is a hybrid of the Korean and Israeli models without the most valuable elements of each. This cannot be a full-fledged bridge to NATO membership, let alone an alternative to joining the Alliance.

Therefore, all discussions going on today do not give grounds to believe that even such a well-mixed model will be more reliable and better balanced in financial terms than Ukraine's NATO membership. That is why we consider “NATO plus” to be the most optimal security model for Ukraine – a model that could single out and absorb the most useful elements of other security models as much as possible with concurrent earnest work on the algorithm for Ukraine's NATO accession already at this juncture.

Is it in principle worth discussing NATO membership as long as part of the territories remain occupied and the war continues on? In our opinion, it is worth and necessary. The time is ripe for a drastic change of Putin's strategic calculation: as long as the war is raging, there is no chance for Ukraine to join the Alliance, so the war must go on. This can be done only by sending a clear political signal: regardless of the situation on the battlefield and the percentage of territories occupied by the Russian Federation, NATO is considering the possibility of inviting Ukraine to the Alliance and starting the accession process with the appropriate application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, at least with respect to the Kyiv-controlled territories.

In addition, the very fact of the existence of a historical precedent, when West Germany – a country with part of its territories occupied – was able to join the Alliance, is a reason why the option of gradual NATO accession can be seriously considered for Ukraine as well. Let us emphasize here: it is precisely gradual, not partial, NATO accession that is currently mostly mentioned in the context of discussions by those who bring up this scenario for Ukraine as a possible and far-from-perfect “Plan B” or even “Plan C.” The invitation and entry into the Alliance with all the de-occupied territories should certainly remain “Plan A.” Please note that the prerequisite for the accession of West Germany, recorded in the Final Act of the London Conference of October 1954, was not the renunciation of East Germany, but Bonn's commitment not to seek the de-occupation of East Germany and the unification of the country by force, only political and diplomatically. However, in Ukraine’s case, there certainly can be its own, Ukrainian, model of gradual entry with its own prerequisites.

Moscow's Reaction vs Western Courage

All the existing security models are tied to the United States, but the US did not immediately give is consent to them. Most of the models analyzed demonstrate that it took time and incredible diplomatic efforts to convince Washington to implement models that today, many decades after their launch, appear to be completely natural or even initiated by Washington. In the case of, say, South Korea, which has had a bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty since 1953 (providing it with security guarantees), Washington was not immediately convinced to sign such a document. As early as two months prior to its approval, the US actively offered various forms of security commitments that did not include actual security guarantees.

In the situation with the NATO accession of West Germany, the US also objected to this option for a long time. Instead, they cheered for the inclusion of West Germany in the newly established European Defense Community (EOC), initiated by France. At one point, Washington even threatened to cut aid to Bonn if it continued to resist joining the EU. However, for the Chancellor of West Germany, Konrad Adenauer, the agreements, which would provide security guarantees specifically from the US, were of fundamental importance. In the end, the process of joining the EOC was blocked by Britain and unexpectedly not supported by the National Assembly of France, which, in fact, formally initiated the Community. Only after that, the United States agreed to admit West Germany to NATO.

Many security models were implemented in the face of stiff opposition from the Kremlin, but Washington and other Western capitals did not lack the courage to implement decisive policies. Ironically enough, today's Russia is a much smaller power than the USSR was at one time; it is not even perceived as a direct threat to the national interests of the United States (although it is classified as the most direct immediate threat to NATO in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance). But the fear of it in the American and some European capitals (especially Berlin) is much higher now than it used to be in the past. In particular, in the case of West Germany, the Soviet Union clearly articulated that the future unification of Germany was possible only on the basis of neutrality. Interestingly the decision on the accession of West Germany to the Alliance was recorded in the Final Act of the London Conference in October 1954, and the accession itself took place in May 1955 – that is, more than half a year passed between the political decision and the actual accession to the Alliance, but this did not provoke new escalation on the part of Moscow. Moreover, actually a month after joining the Alliance, in June 1955, the USSR sent a letter to Bonn with a proposal to normalize relations and an invitation to Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscow.

Despite security guarantees from the US (in the case of South Korea), NATO membership, or the de facto allied nature of security cooperation (Israel and Taiwan), both sides focused on building up their own armies and military-industrial complexes. An important internal component of Taiwan's security model is that Taiwan has developed and manufactures a significant part of its weapons independently with the help of its own military-industrial complex (and thanks to partners’ technologies). The systematic and steadily growing support of the US helped to develop Israel's own production capacity significantly. South Korea began large-scale and systematic defense industrialization in 1974. Since then, the country has improved its production capacity so much that by 2022 it became the world’s ninth largest arms exporter. Germany is currently the fifth largest exporter of weapons globally.

When introducing or improving each of the security models, the US (and its allies) proceeded not least from financial considerations — how expensive a certain model would be and what are the ways of optimizing it without affecting the efficiency of the model. In the case of South Korea, for instance, there was an agreement from the beginning that the United States would bear the costs of maintaining the country's military personnel, while South Korea would bear the costs of equipment and labor maintenance, necessary construction works and utilities. Similarly, in the case of West Germany, one of the important arguments in favor of Bonn joining NATO in the American capital was a financial one. Ukraine is also located in the Euro-Atlantic area, so it has every right to apply for NATO membership, particularly from the point of view of it being the most financially balanced proposal.

An important conclusion regarding the models analyzed is as follows: they are mostly not static. Most of them did not appear immediately in the form in which we know them today. They were predominantly modified and changed over time. For example, in the case of the Korean model, certain elements came up or, conversely, disappeared over a period of time. Whereas the Mutual Defense Treaty (providing for security guarantees) was signed immediately within the framework of the armistice (1953), the agreement on the stationing of American forces (Status of Forces Agreement) was concluded only in 1966. The agreement on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons dates back to 1957, but effectively ceased to exist in 1991, and these weapons left the territory of the Korean Peninsula. In the case of Israel, the most valuable practical element of this model—ten-year long-term support memorandums—appeared only in 1999. In the case of the Taiwan model, it is constantly being upgraded in terms of what means Taiwan needs exactly to contain China more effectively.

The full text of the discussion paper can be found on the website of the New Europe Center. Authors of the research are Alyona Hetmanchuk, Director of the New Europe Center; Leo Litra, Senior Analyst of the New Europe Center; Nataliia Butyrska, expert in East Asian affairs; Yurii Poita, a visiting researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) in Taipei; Serhii Solodkyi, First Deputy Director of the New Europe Center.

Read this article in russian and Ukrainian.