What does the "law on the prohibition of the UOC-MP" prohibit?

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted in the first reading draft law No. 8371 – "on the banning of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate," as the majority of the mass media and the people's elected officials called it. (Pro)Russian Orthodox publics with even greater energy spread the news about another "crime" of the Ukrainian authorities against the "canonical church" on news channels. However, the government draft law is the only one that was honored to be brought up for discussion and voting, out of a dozen others, it is the most "friendly" that will not cause significant changes or harm. And the actual existence of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine is practically not threatened by anything.

Government draft law No. 8371, taken as a basis, indeed provides for the possibility of terminating the activity of a religious organization by a court decision. However, it is, of course, not about the termination of the activity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) as such – as for some reason many precocious "experts" have decided. It is not about the church in general, but about "religious organizations". Such organizations, according to our laws, are specific parishes, monasteries, educational institutions and other legal entities working under the church banner.

The denomination in general – what we mean by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) – is not an "organization" from a legal point of view. Accordingly, the authorities will have to "stop the activity" not for the "churches with a center you-know-where", but of individual parishes and organizations, the total number of which is over 10,000. For this, it will be necessary for each of them to carry out a "religious examination of the activities of religious organizations in order to identify subordination in canonical and organizational matters to the centers of influence of the religious organization (association), the management center of which is located...".

After that, orders will be issued to religious organizations, which, let's say, will be fulfilled by them. Or may not be fulfilled by them. And then there will be an opportunity to file lawsuits against them (if these organizations are not forgotten by that time). No matter what the court decides, you can appeal to all possible instances. A legal department has long been established in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which works quite successfully (and is well financed). In general, the legal case in each specific case can drag on for any length of time, and it is not known where it will reach first – to the Supreme Court of Ukraine or will extend to some indefinite period of time.

Therefore, the draft law taken as a basis is not simply a "law on the banning of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)" – it is generally not adopted in order to in any way affect the "Moscow priests". In the best case, it will give an opportunity to influence specific few religious organizations, namely the Kyiv Metropolitanate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), for example, as well as the most prominent monasteries. Even the local authorities are unlikely to bother with the examinations of individual parishes – it is much easier to make a decision to transfer the temple to another denomination or to close it altogether "until the circumstances are clarified", as they do now, without any legal basis.

It is indicative that immediately after its adoption, the "most patriotic" deputies felt the need to justify their vote in favor of the government's draft law. From their speeches, it becomes clear that they voted not so much for a specific draft law (which, as already mentioned above. And which, by the way, does not solve the "problem of the presence of Moscow priests"), but for the sake of the problem somehow starting to be solved.

This is an interesting nuance that confirms the assumption that the authorities really have no desire to fundamentally solve the problem of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine. But it also shows that there are no politicians and political forces in Ukraine that could force the authorities to do what is needed (at least in their opinion). The show, as a result of which this, the most loyal, draft law, which will not make any special changes, became the favorite of the legislative race, unfolded before everyone's eyes.

Everyone knew that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had several draft laws "prohibiting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)". The fact that they were about to be brought up for discussion and voting has been talked about since at least December 1, 2022, when President Zelenskyy signed the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) on the threat to the national security of Ukraine by the Moscow Patriarchate. Time passed and was full of events: the scandal surrounding the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, visits by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) to bishops, and materials about the collaborating priests. Against this background, the silence of the members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine became unbearable. And finally there was an interview with Speaker Stefanchuk, who explained everything by the fact that the deputies do not want to vote for the banning of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), and precisely because of this. This is done in order not to give Moscow a reason for joy, if the initiative fails during the vote, he will not put this issue on the agenda.

Everything worked as it should. The views of the indignant (and overexcited) public were directed at the people's elected officials. Those, for their part, got nervous, collected and showed the public signatures under an appeal to the speaker that they were ready to vote. After that, one (the same loyal governmental) draft law was put on the agenda. For which everyone had to vote. The presidential forces in the parliament explained quite cleverly to their political opponents that this is the only draft law "on banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)" that can be submitted to the voting process. Either they will vote for this draft law, or they will fail and thereby give a reason to consider themselves lobbyists of "Moscow priests" in the Ukrainian parliament.

One can understand the people's deputies who, after this vote, wanted to explain their position or even justify themselves to the voters. But once a question has been decided, it is difficult to make another decision. Unfortunately, this is another example of the fact that the parliament cannot play the role of a counterweight to politicians on Bankova Street.

"Church legislation" had (and still has) two main goals. The first is foreign policy: to reduce (preferably to zero) the possibility of Russian influence in Ukraine through church channels. Propaganda of the "Russian world", claims to Ukraine as "its territory" (whether "canonical" or "historical"), the myth of the "Trinity of Holy Russia" and other delusions should not poison the consciousness of Ukrainian citizens.

The second problem is an internal Ukrainian problem related to the redistribution of church property. A situation has arisen in which the removal and distribution of temples has been relegated to a kind of gray zone where neither God's nor earthly laws apply. Undoubtedly, at one time, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) received many privileges and privileged property for use and ownership. Perhaps these decisions should be reconsidered. But it was decided not to pay attention to the situation, and "historical justice" is most often restored with the help of fights, illegal actions of local authorities, with the help of construction tools such as chainsaws and breaking glass in buildings.

Legislators actually had (and still have) two ways. Or to take drastic measures and really forbid the church of the Moscow Patriarchate to operate on the territory of Ukraine (at least for the duration of a full-scale war). Or not to raise the "church question" at the legislative level at all and rely on the political evolution of society – on the fact that the problem of the Moscow Patriarchate will one day end by itself.

This, of course, is almost sarcasm. No politician can avoid such a hype topic as the divided Ukrainian Orthodoxy. So the current "legislative initiative" currently has only one visible and easily predictable result – a new wave of hype. One of the pro-Russian church channels appeared with a huge headline: "Christ was crucified again in Ukraine." Patriarch Kirill once again quickly addressed all progressive humanity with a request to protect the Ukrainian church from "persecution".

It was possible to ignore this – things happen in the world every day that are much worse than the clumsy legislative initiatives of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – if it had any meaning for the situation in our country.

Read this article in Ukrainian and russian.